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Sohn: The Double-Edged Sword of Indian Gaming

NOTES & COMMENTS
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF INDIAN GAMING

I.

INTRODUCTION

Indian gaming is a growing economic phenomenon that inevitably affects
surrounding communities, state governments, and hundreds of Indian tribes around the
United States. This comment contends that the effect of gaming on Indian tribes
themselves is particularly complex and, to a large extent, contradictory. On the one
hand, Indian gaming has spurred great economic development in Indian country unlike
any other economic enterprise before or since. On the other hand, the operation of
Indian gaming has reduced tribal sovereignty in several key areas. To the extent that
Indian gaming has simultaneously given tribes significant wealth and taken away
significant sovereignty, it has been a distinctly double-edged sword from the tribal
perspective.
Part II of this comment briefly traces the history of Indian gaming and explains
how Indian gaming has provided large economic benefits to gaming tribes. Part III
defines tribal sovereignty and then explains how gaming has reduced tribal sovereignty
in three main categories. First, Part III.B shows how the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)' provides for heightened state regulation of gaming tribes, thus reducing the
sovereignty of gaming tribes vis-A-vis the states. Second, Part III.C shows how Indian
gaming has made it more costly for would-be tribes to gain federal recognition, which is
a necessary first step for any tribe that wishes to exercise sovereignty. Third, Part III.D
explains how gaming has harmed the sovereignty of all existing tribes-gaming and nongaming alike-by influencing the recent Supreme Court opinion in City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation.2 Sherrill deals a significant blow to tribal sovereignty, limiting
tribes' ability to exercise authority over recently acquired land parcels. Finally, Part IV
suggests that Indian gaming may continue to erode other aspects of tribal sovereignty in
the near future.

1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
2. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
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THE RISE OF INDIAN GAMING AS AN ECONOMIC FORCE

The Genesis of Indian Gaming

While Indian gaming is perhaps the preeminent issue in Indian country today, it is
of relatively recent vintage. Commercial Indian gaming began in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, as a few tribes-mostly in Florida and California-set up bingo halls on
their reservations to generate revenue. 3 These tribal bingo halls generally did not
comply with state laws regulating bingo, 4 and consequently state law enforcement
officials sought to shut down the bingo operations. The tribes responded by suing in
federal court, arguing that the states had no right to enforce their gaming laws on tribally
owned bingo halls located on Indian land.5
In the 1981 case Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Butterworth,6 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Florida could not enforce its bingo restrictions against the Seminole
Tribe's bingo hall. The court reasoned that Florida generally treated bingo as a regulated
activity, not a prohibited activity, 7 and that the Seminole Tribe was not subject to
Florida's civil regulatory laws. 8 A year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used
substantially similar logic and held that California could not apply its bingo regulations
9
against the Barona Band's bingo hall near San Diego.
Under the aegis of the Seminole and Barona precedents, gambling halls grew
rapidly throughout Indian country. 10 While bingo remained the dominant game, Indian
tribes increasingly set up poker rooms and other card games. II Ultimately, the Supreme
Court had to decide whether these gaming enterprises could exist free from state
regulation, and the Court did so in the landmark case of California v. Cabazon Band of
12
Mission Indians.
B.

The Cabazon Decision

The facts of Cabazon were quite similar to those of the earlier Seminole and
Barona cases. The Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (Band) operated a bingo hall and

3. Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Indian Gaming and Tribal Sovereignty: The Casino
Compromise 39 (U. Press Kan. 2005).
4. For example, the Seminole Tribe of Florida operated its bingo hall six days a week and offered cash
prizes in excess of $100; these provisions exceeded Florida's limits on permissible days of operation and prize
values. W. Dale Mason, Indian Gaming: Tribal Sovereignty andAmerican Politics46 (U. Okla. Press 2000).
5. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981); Barona Group of the Capitan
Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wis., 518
F. Supp. 712 (W.D. 1981).
6. 658F.2d310.
7. Id. at 314.
8. Id. at 314-15.
9. Barona, 694 F.2d at 1189. For a more detailed discussion of the rationale underlying Seminole and
Barona, review the discussion of the Supreme Court's Cabazon decision, infra notes 13 to 32 and
accompanying text. The Cabazon court relied heavily upon the logic of Seminole and Barona in reaching its
conclusions.
10. Light & Rand, supra n. 3, at 40.
11. Id.
12. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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poker room on its reservation in Riverside County, California. 13 The Riverside County
sheriff announced his intention to shut down both enterprises because they violated a
state statute regulating bingo and a county ordinance restricting poker, respectively. 14 In
response, the Band sued for a declaratory judgment that the sheriff could not apply state
and county laws against the tribe's gaming operations. 15 The district court agreed and
issued the declaratory judgment for the Band, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 16
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. 17 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court first had to decide whether Public Law 280,18 a federal statute, gave California
the authority to apply its gambling laws against the Band. PL 280 is a statute that
originally gave six states, including California, criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian
country. 19 However, a previous Supreme Court decision, Bryan v. Itasca County, had
drawn a distinction between PL 280's grant of criminal and civil jurisdiction. According
to Bryan, PL 280 granted states broad authority to enforce their criminal laws in Indian
country. But in the civil context, PL 280 merely granted states jurisdiction over private
21
litigation and did not give those states general regulatory authority over Indian country.
Thus, in the Cabazon context, PL 280 could have authorized California to apply its
gambling laws against the Band if those laws were deemed "criminal/prohibitory" laws,
but PL 280 could not be relied upon if the California gambling laws were deemed
"civil/regulatory" laws. The Cabazon Court noted that California allowed certain types
of gambling-including regulated bingo, card rooms, and horse racing-and actually
promoted gambling through its state-run lottery. 2 2 Accordingly, the Court held that
23
"California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular."
Because California's existing laws against gambling were civil/regulatory rather than
criminal/prohibitory, PL 280 did not authorize California to apply those gambling laws
24
against the Band.
Once the Court disposed of California's PL 280 argument, it still had to determine
whether common law principles of federal Indian law allowed California to apply its

13. Id.at 204-05.
14. Id. at 205-06; Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Co. of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. Cabazon,480 U.S. at 206.
16. Co. of Riverside, 783 F.2d at 901, 906.
17. Cabazon,480 U.S. at 222.
18. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 25
U.S.C., and 28 USC).
19. These six states are sometimes called "mandatory" PL 280 states. PL 280 also contained a mechanism
by which other states could assume similar jurisdiction by enacting state legislation to that effect. By 1968,
nine additional states had chosen to assume some or all aspects of PL 280 jurisdiction. In 1968, Congress
amended PL 280 to hold that additional states could only assume jurisdiction with the consent of their tribes,
and as of 1997 not a single tribe had so consented. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the
Problem of Lawlessness in CaliforniaIndian Country, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1405, 1406-08 (1997).
20. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
21. Id.at384-85.
22. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
23. Id. The Court rejected California's argument that its bingo laws were criminal/prohibitory because the
state imposed misdemeanor criminal penalties for breach of those laws. According to the Court, the mere fact
that an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal penalties does not transform that law into a
criminal/prohibitory law for purposes of PL 280 jurisdiction.
24. Id. at212&n. 11.
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gambling laws against the Band. According to the Court, the relevant test was the
flexible preemption test of New Mexico v. MescaleroApache Tribe.25 Under Mescalero,
state regulation in Indian country is preempted if the proposed state regulation "interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law,26unless the
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."
Applying the Mescalero test, the Cabazon Court found that the federal government
had encouraged Indian gaming by issuing grants and other financial assistance and by
approving tribal ordinances which set forth the contours of Indian gaming. 27 These
federal actions indicated that there were "important federal interests" in promoting
29
Indian gaming, 28 as well as tribal interests which paralleled these federal interests.
On the other side of the scale, the Court found that California's only asserted
interest in applying its gambling laws against the Band was to prevent the infiltration of
organized crime onto tribal gaming facilities. 30 However, California had produced no
evidence that organized crime was presently operating in and around the Band's
facilities. 3 1 Thus, the Court concluded that the state interest in regulating the Band's
gaming operations was outweighed by the federal and tribal interests in promoting those
operations, and so the California gambling laws were preempted vis-A-vis the Band. 32
C.

CongressionalResponse to Cabazon: IGRA

It did not take Congress long to respond to Cabazon. Given Cabazon's
disallowance of state regulation over Indian gaming, Congress remained the only nonIndian actor that could effectively place limits on the Indian gaming industry. While
Congress had debated various bills to regulate Indian gaming even before Cabazon,33 the
largely unexpected Cabazon holding "threw the ball into Congress's lap to do something,
34

fast."

Accordingly, in 1988, Congress passed IGRA 35 and President Reagan signed the
bill into law on October 17 of that year. While IGRA is a complicated law, its basic
framework is to divide the universe of Indian gaming into three classes and create
different regulatory rules for each class.
According to IGRA, Class I gaming includes social games conducted for nominal
prizes and traditional games of chance which are played in conjunction with tribal
ceremonies. 36 Regulation of Class I gaming is left solely to the discretion of the

25. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
26. Id. at 334.
27. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217-18.
28. Id. at 217.
29. Id. at 219.
30. Id. at 220.
31. Id. at 221.
32. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221-22.
33. Indeed, Congress had debated various Indian gaming bills throughout the decade of the 1980s. See
Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 Am. Indian L. Rev. 151, 155-63 (1990).
34. Nelson Rose, Untitled Comment, in Indian Gaming and the Law 3 (William Eadington ed., U. Nev.
Inst. for the Study of Gambling & Commercial Gaming 2004).
35. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
36. Id. at § 2703(6).
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individual tribes. 3 7 Class II gaming includes bingo and bingo-like games, as well as
non-banked card games such as poker. 38 Class II gaming is jointly regulated by the
individual tribes and a newly established National Indian Gaming Commission, which
has the power to approve or deny tribal gaming ordinances. 39 Finally, Class III gaming
comprises all games which are not included in Class I or Class II.
Thus, Class III
games include banked card games like blackjack, pai gow, and baccarat, as well as
roulette, craps, slot machines, and pari-mutuel sports betting. Class III gaming-often
called "casino-style" gaming-is subject to all the restrictions of Class II gaming, with
the additional requirement that the tribe negotiate a gaming compact with the state and
41
draft its tribal gaming ordinances in conformity with that tribal-state compact.
Upon request by a tribe, the state has a statutory duty to bargain in good faith for a
mutually agreeable gaming compact. 42 Tribal-state compacts may include the following
subjects: (i) provisions regarding the application of criminal and civil laws to the gaming
enterprise, (ii) allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the tribe and state,
(iii) taxation by the tribe, (iv) state assessments of sufficient money to defray the costs of
state regulation, (v) remedies for breach of contract, (vi) standards for the operation and
maintenance of gaming facilities, and (vii) any other subjects directly related to the
operation of gaming activities. 43 Once a tribal-state compact is satisfactorily negotiated,
44
it must be ratified by the Secretary of the Interior before taking effect.
As originally passed, IGRA allowed a tribe to sue in federal district court to
45
enforce the state's obligation to bargain in good faith for a Class III gaming compact.
If the district court agreed with the tribe that the state was not bargaining in good faith,
the court could appoint a mediator who would receive proposed compacts from both
parties and select the one that the mediator deemed most appropriate. 4 6 If the parties did
not agree to the terms of this mediator-selected compact, the mediator would notify the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary would prescribe gaming regulations for the
47
tribe in accordance with the mediator's compact.
However, in the 1996 case Seminole Tribe v. Florida,the Supreme Court held that
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity precluded tribes from suing a state in

37. Id. at§ 2710(a)(l).
38. Id. at § 2703(7). "Banked" card games refer to card games in which all players compete against a
single opponent, usually the casino itself. "Non-banked" card games refer to card games in which the players
compete against each other.
39. Id. at § 2710(b). IGRA sets forth a number of criteria that the Commission must consider in deciding
whether to approve tribal gaming ordinances. For instance, the tribe is only allowed to use gaming profits for
discrete purposes, 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(b)(2)(B), and the gaming facilities must be constructed and maintained "in
a manner that adequately protects the environment and the public health and safety." Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(E).
40. Id. at § 2703(8).
41. Id. at§ 2710(d)(1)(C).
42. Id at § 2710(d)(3)(A). This statutory duty is not absolute; a state need not bargain with the tribe if the
state prohibits (rather than merely regulates) gaming by non-Indians. See infra nn. 79-101 and accompanying
text.
43. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
44. Id at § 2710(d)(8).
45. Id. at § 2710(d)(7)(A).
46. Id. at § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
47. Id. at § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
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federal court without the state's consent. 48 Thus, Seminole Tribe allows states to shortcircuit IGRA's elaborate lawsuit provision by invoking their Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit.
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, the Secretary of the Interior adopted a set of
regulations to be applied when a state asserts its Eleventh Amendment immunity against
a tribal lawsuit under IGRA. 49 These regulations basically track IGRA's original lawsuit
procedure but authorize the Secretary to perform the judicial functions that IGRA had
50
originally entrusted to the federal district court.
A few states-most notably California-have superseded Seminole Tribe by
prospectively waiving their Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal lawsuits under
IGRA. 5 1 California's waiver of immunity was almost certainly in response to a
remarkable Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Spokane Tribe.52 Spokane Tribe held
that the lawsuit provision of IGRA is an inseparable component of the Class III
compacting process; Congress would not have enacted IGRA had it known that states
could block tribal lawsuits through their Eleventh Amendment immunity. 53 Therefore,
Spokane Tribe concluded that a tribe may offer Class III gaming without a compact if the
state frustrates the compacting process by raising Eleventh Amendment immunity
54
against a tribal lawsuit.
Presumably, California feared the possibility that its tribes might initiate Class III
gaming without first bargaining with the State. Therefore, California waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to sidestep Spokane Tribe and preserve IGRA's
requirement that no tribe offer Class III gaming without first striking a tribal-state
compact.
D.

The TribalBenefits of Indian Gaming

At the dawn of IGRA, Indian gaming in the United States grossed approximately
$110 million per year. 55 Most of this money came from bingo, although some tribes
offered poker rooms and a small number offered casino-style gaming. 56 But in the
eighteen years since IGRA's enactment, Indian gaming has grown by leaps and bounds.
In 2004, Indian gaming grossed $19.4 billion from three hundred seventy-five discrete
tribal gaming enterprises across the United States. 57 Indian gaming was responsible for
creating an estimated 553,000 jobs in that year. 58 While pre-IGRA gaming was mostly

48. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
49. Seegenerally25 C.F.R. § 291 (2004).
50. See Eric S. Lent, Student Author, Are the States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State
Revenue-Sharingunder the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 Geo. L.J. 451, 471-72 (2003).
51. See Model Tribal-State Gaming Compact § 9.4, http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/enabling/tsc.pdf (Sept. 10,
1999).
52. 139 F.3d 1297 (9thCir. 1998).
53. Id at 1300.
54. Id. at 1301.
55. Rose, supra n. 34, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., Tribal Gaming Revenues, http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/
NIGC%20Uploads/Tribal%20Data/tribalgamingrevenues05.pdf (accessed Dec. 30, 2006).
58. Natl. Indian Gaming Assn., An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2004,
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limited to bingo, modem Indian gaming runs the gamut from59modest bingo halls to giant
gambling resorts offering a full range of casino-style games.
As for gaming's effects on the participant tribes themselves, demographic studies
have found that gaming is strongly associated with improved quality of life on Indian
reservations. For example, median household income among gaming tribes rose by 35%
61
For non-gaming tribes, the rise was only 14%.
between 1990 and 2000.
Unemployment decreased by 4.8% over the same period for gaming tribes, while nongaming tribes showed only a 1.8% decrease in unemployment. 6 2 In fact, almost every
census-measured category showed a significantly greater socioeconomic improvement
for gaming tribes than non-gaming tribes between 1990 and 2000.63
Not surprisingly, numerous commentators have seized on these data and
proclaimed that gaming is an indispensable tool for prosperity and economic
development in Indian country. Gaming is often called the "new buffalo," an evocative
phrase meant to underscore how gaming provides Indian tribes with sustenance just as
the wild buffalo did centuries ago. 64 One noted Indian scholar recently opined that
"[g]aming is one of the few economic development strategies making inroads toward
prosperity for many tribes." 65 Another commentator declared that "[t]ribal gaming is the
one successful economic venture that has worked virtually every place a tribe has
established a gaming operation."

66

It is hard to argue with the contention that Indian gaming has been an economic

success or that gaming profits have dramatically improved the quality of life for many

http://www.indiangaming.org/NIGA econ impact_2004.pdf (accessed Dec. 30, 2006).
59. For example, Foxwoods Resort and Casino, owned by the Mashantucket Pequot tribe of Connecticut,
ranks as the largest gambling enterprise in North America. Joseph R. Selvidio, Blumenthal v. Babbitt: How
Three Words May Help Redefine Sovereignty for America's Most Powerful Tribe, 23 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 247,
247 (2004). California, the single largest state in terms of Indian gaming revenue, has roughly sixty tribes
which are presently operating Class III casinos pursuant to tribal-state compacts. See Cal. Gambling Control
Commn., Tribal-State Gaming Compacted Casino List, http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/tribalcasinos.html (accessed
Dec. 30, 2006).
60. Joseph Kalt & Jonathan Taylor, American Indians on Reservations: A Databook of Socioeconomic
Change between the 1990 and 2000 Censusesxi, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/documents/
AmencanlndiansonReservationsADatabookofSocioeconomicChange.pdf (Jan. 2005).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Kalt and Taylor charted fourteen measures of socioeconomic health and found that gaming tribes
registered larger increases than non-gaming tribes in twelve of those fourteen categories.
64. See e.g. Sherry M. Thompson, Student Author, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of
Reservation Gaming in the United States and Canada, II Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 520, 521 (1994) ("The
recent trend of casino gambling on Indian lands has been likened to the mythical return of the buffalo. The
great beast that once darkened the plains and provided Indians with sustenance has returned in the guise of slot
machines, blackjack tables, roulette wheels and bingo cards.... [G]aming proceeds have raised impoverished
nations from the depths of despair." (footnotes omitted)).
65. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5
Chap. L. Rev. 47, 85-86 (2002).
66. Gary C. Anders, Indian Gaming: Financialand Regulatory Issues, 556 Annals Am. Acad. Politcal &
Soc. Sci. 98, 102 (1998) (quoting Rick Hill, chairman of the Natl. Indian Gaming Assn.). This seemingly
extravagant claim has found cautious support in later empirical research. A recent study by Light and Rand
indicated virtually no instances of tribes closing their casinos due to lack of business. Light & Rand, supra n.
3, at 10 n. 28. However, many Indian gaming operations yield very modest profits. In 2004, for example, one
quarter of all tribal gaming operations generated less than $3 million in annual revenue. See Natl. Indian
Gaming Commn., supra n. 57.
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tribal members. 6 7 But, economic success is not the only criterion to consider in
assessing the effects of Indian gaming. Gaming has had more negative effects on tribal
sovereignty.
III.
A.

THE IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

What is Tribal Sovereignty?

Tribal sovereignty in the federal Indian law context connotes political autonomy,
or, as the Supreme Court has put it, the right of Indian tribes "to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." 68 While this articulation of sovereignty refers to the positive
right of Indian tribes to govern themselves, the major legal battles over Indian
sovereignty have focused on tribes' negative liberty to be free from external control by
federal and state governments. Thus, famous early Indian law cases asked whether the
federal government could regulate the sale of Indian land 69 and whether states had the
70
power to impose criminal laws on Indian reservations.
By the turn of the twentieth century, it was clear that the tribes had lost their battle
to retain their sovereignty vis-A-vis the federal government. In a series of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated
the rule that Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes. 7 1 Under this judicially
constructed "plenary power doctrine," Congress can regulate all aspects of Indian
72
country irrespective of subject matter.
Thus, the sovereignty battles of the latter twentieth century have mostly focused on
the extent to which the states can regulate Indian tribes, their members, and their land.73

67. Even beyond the raw numbers, a large number of compelling anecdotes illustrate the transformative
effect that Indian gaming has had for many tribes. For example, the Wisconsin Oneida Tribe has seen its
poverty rate drop ten-fold, from 50% to 5%, since the tribe opened its casino. Chuck Nowlen, Casinos Bring
Benefits, Capital Times Al (Jan. 20, 2004). The United Auburn Indian Community in California, whose
members lived in "slum-like" conditions just three years ago, has used its new casino profits to provide free
medical and dental care for all tribal members and plans to provide free housing within a few years. Louis
Sahagun, Tribes Fear Backlash to Prosperity,L.A. Times B 1 (May 3, 2004). The Oneida Nation in New York
has used its casino profits to find a new cultural center and museum to preserve its tribal heritage. Brian
Patterson, Preserving the Oneida Nation Culture, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 121, 123 (2000). And the
Miccosukee Tribe has used new-found casino revenue to restore and protect the ecosystem of its Florida
Everglades reservation, "outmaneuverfing] some of Florida's and Washington's strongest lobbies ... to help
set tougher water-quality standards." Richard Louv, Is That a UFO Landing, or Just Another Casino? Union
Tribune G3 (Apr. 24, 2004); see also John Holland, Tribe Gambles on UM Debate: Miccosukees Seek
Influence with $1 Million, South Fla. Sun-Sentinel AI (Sept. 28, 2004).
68. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). Indian scholar Robert Porter described tribal sovereignty in
similar terms, calling it "freedom, the freedom of a people to choose what their future will be." Robert B.
Porter, The Meaning ofIndigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 75, 75 (2002).
69. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
70. Worcesterv. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
71. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219, 260-61.
72. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over Indian Nations: An
Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 418 (1988). Laurence correctly
notesthat Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs is not synonymous with absolute power. Congress is
still bound by Bill of Rights restrictions in its Indian dealings. Id. Thus, Congress cannot, for example, take
Indian reservation land without just compensation. See U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
73. Another contentious sovereignty issue, often linked to the question of state authority, deals with the
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For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has wrestled with state authority to regulate
hunting on Indian reservations, 74 state power to tax Indians, 75 and state jurisdiction over
lawsuits against Indian defendants. 76 Congress has also played a large role in defining
state power over Indians by passing statutes which grant states authority in Indian affairs
or take away such authority. 7 7 The interplay of federal case law and statutory law has
created a complex set of rules regarding state jurisdiction over Indian tribes and tribal
affairs. In the following sections, this comment addresses how Indian gaming has altered
these rules in the direction of increased state authority and decreased tribal sovereignty.
B.

The Effects of IGRA on State Prohibition,Regulation, and Taxation of Indian
Gaming

IGRA itself allows for substantial state regulation and de facto taxation of Indian
gaming. 78 In some cases, IGRA even allows states to block Indian gaming entirely. The
large role states have in regulating and taxing Indian gaming under IGRA stands in sharp
contrast to traditional principles of federal Indian law, which contemplate a very limited
role for the states in taxing and regulating on-reservation Indian enterprises.
1.

State Power to Prohibit Indian Gaming: A Back-Door Extension of PL 280

The clearest way that IGRA enlarges state authority is by allowing states to block
Class II and Class III Indian gaming as long as that state prohibits analogous gaming by
non-Indians as well. Specifically, IGRA declares that Class II and Class III Indian
gaming is only lawful if it is "located in a [s]tate that permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person, organization, or entity." 79 This means that a state can block
Indian gaming simply by not "permit[ting] such gaming" for any purpose by any person.
In a sense, this language grants PL 280 authority to all fifty states in the gaming
context. Recall from the discussion of Cabazon that the U.S. Supreme Court had to
decide whether PL 280 gave California-one of fifteen PL 280 states-the right to
enforce its gambling laws against the Cabazon Band. The Supreme Court ultimately
decided that PL 280 did not grant such authority. It found that California allowed a

authority that tribes possess over non-Indians within reservation boundaries. See e.g. Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that the tribe has authority to zone
non-Indian fee land within "closed" portion of reservation but lacks such authority within "open" portion of
reservation); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that the tribe lacks authority to
try non-Indian criminal defendant who committed crime on reservation land).
74. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324.
75. McClanahanv. Ariz. Tax Commn., 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
76. Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
77. The most obvious example of a federal statute granting state authonty is PL 280. Review supra notes
18 to 21 and accompanying text. An example of a federal statute which potentially takes away state authority
is the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). As interpreted by EPA, the Clean Air Act gives tribes
the authority to regulate air resources on non-Indian fee land within the borders of their reservation. See 42
U.S.C. § 7601(d); 63 C.F.R. 7254 (1998). Under normal Indian law principles, the state-rather than the
tribe-probably would possess such regulatory authority. See Mont. v. US., 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1980)
(favoring state authority over tribal authority to regulate non-member fee land within the bounds of an Indian
reservation).
78. For an analysis of IGRA's complicated effects on state taxation power, review infra notes 116-142.
79. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(l)(A) (referring to Class 11gaming); id. at § 2710(d)(1)(B) (referring to Class Ill
gaming).
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substantial amount of legal gambling, and thus California "regulate[d] rather than
prohibit[ed] gambling in general and bingo in particular." 80 The implication was that if
California had prohibited all types of gambling, its anti-gambling laws would be deemed
criminal/prohibitory laws and the state could then have used PL 280 to apply those laws
81
against the Cabazon Band.
Under IGRA, every state-not just California and the other PL 280 states-has the
power to block Indian gaming by making its existing gambling laws
criminal/prohibitory. If a state's laws do not "permit such gaming for any purpose by
any person," then Indian gaming is automatically unlawful under IGRA. In this respect,
IGRA performs the same function as a hypothetical statute granting PL 280 authority to
every state.
Later court decisions have fleshed out the meaning of IGRA's "permit such
gaming" language. The main question posed by these cases is how broadly IGRA's
language should be read. For instance, suppose a state allows charity blackjack at
fundraisers. By allowing charity blackjack, the state clearly "permits" blackjack within
the meaning of IGRA, and thus Indian tribes in that state can initiate tribal-state
negotiations for the tribes to offer large-scale commercial blackjack operations. 82 But
what about other Class III games? Does the existence of charity blackjack mean that the
state "permits" Class III gaming as a whole such that states must negotiate with tribes
over all Class III games? Or are state-tribal compacts limited to blackjack because
blackjack is the only specific game permitted by the state?
The two circuits which have directly addressed this question have held that the
latter interpretation is correct: when a state permits a game, it only acquires the
obligation to bargain with tribes for that particulargame. For example, in Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,83 the State refused to negotiate with the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe when the tribe sought to include keno in its casino plans. The tribe
sued in federal court, alleging that the State's intransigence violated its duty under IGRA
84
to negotiate in good faith for a gaming compact.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the tribe's claim. 85 The court held
that South Dakota law permitted video keno but did not permit the traditional keno
which the tribe wanted to offer. 86 The court thus concluded that the state had no
87
obligation to bargain with the tribe over the inclusion of traditional keno.
A year later, the Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Rumsey Indian

80. Supra nn. 22-23 and accompanying text.
81 Id.
82. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that when a state
authorizes a casino game to be played at charity fundraisers, the state "permits" that game under IGRA such
that tribes may enter compact negotiations to offer that game in a commercial setting).
83. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
84. Id.at 276.
85. Id. at 275.
86. Id.at 279.
87. Id. ("We agree with the state that it need not negotiate traditional keno if only video keno is permitted
in South Dakota. The 'such gaming' language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B) does not require the state to
negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not presently permit.").
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Rancheriaof Wintun Indians v. Wilson. 88 In Rumsey, a coalition of Indian tribes sought
to negotiate tribal compacts for certain banked card games and slot machines and sued
when the State of California refused to enter compact negotiations. 8 9 The State claimed
that it did not permit banked card games or slot machines, and thus it was not obligated
to negotiate for these games under IGRA. 90 The tribes responded that the State did
permit video lottery machines and pari-mutuel horse racing, among other types of
gaming. According to the tribes, this wide range of permitted Class III gaming was
enough to trigger the State's obligation
to negotiate with the tribes for the proposed slot
91
machines and banked card games.
The court sided with the State, holding that "IGRA does not require a state to
negotiate over one form of Class III gaming activity simply because it has legalized
another, albeit similar form of gaming." 92 Thus, the State's allowance of video lottery
did not require it to negotiate over "functionally similar" slot machines. 93 Similarly, the
State was not obligated to negotiate for banked card games merely because it permitted
94
banked games other than card games.
Many scholars have claimed that Cheyenne River and Rumsey create a circuit split
by running counter to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' earlier decision in
Mashantucket.95 Indeed, the scholarly consensus is that Mashantucket requires a state to
negotiate for all Class III games as long as the state permits any single Class III game.
While Cheyenne River and Rumsey can certainly be criticized on their merits,
claims of a circuit split are greatly exaggerated. In fact, the Mashantucket court never
directly addressed the question that scholars routinely ascribe to it.
In Mashantucket, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe sought to establish Class III
casino gaming on its Connecticut reservation. Prevailing Connecticut law sharply
restricted casino gaming, but Connecticut did allow non-profit organizations to
occasionally offer casino games at "Las Vegas Night" fundraising events. The State
contended that its limited allowance of charity Las Vegas Nights did not require it to
96
negotiate with the Pequots over their plans for a large-scale commercial casino.
The Second Circuit disagreed with Connecticut, holding its limited Las Vegas

88. 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. Id. at 1255. The tribes specifically sought to negotiate for "electronic pull tab machines," but the court
readily concluded that these machines were considered "slot machines" under California law. Id. at 1256.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1258.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 913 F.2d 1024. For an example of such scholarly commentary, review Anthony J. Marks, Student
Author, A House of Cards: Has the Federal Government Succeeded in Regulating Indian Gaming? 17 Loy.
L.A. Ent. L.J. 157, 195 (1996) ("The Ninth Circuit's decision in Rumsey created a split among the circuits.
Specifically, the interpretations of IGRA by the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit directly conflict.").
Review also Judge William Canby's dissent from the denial to re-hear Rumsey en banc. 64 F.3d 1250, 125253 (9th Cir. 1994) ("This is a case of major significance in the administration of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act ...and it has been decided incorrectly, in a manner that conflicts with the Second Circuit's interpretation
of the same statutory language."). Rumsey has received much more scholarly attention than Cheyenne River,
probably because the Ninth Circuit encompasses far more lucrative Indian gaming operations than does the
Eighth Circuit.
96. Mashantucket, 913 F.2d at 1029.
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Night gaming triggered its obligation to negotiate for the tribe's casino plans. The court
expressly rejected "the proposition that a state which allows charities to engage in
episodic, regulated casino-type gambling may still be deemed to be in a prohibitive,
rather than regulatory, posture as to commercial casino gambling." 97 Instead, the court
found that the existence of Class III gaming at charity Las Vegas 98
Nights indicated that
Connecticut "permitted" commercial Class III gaming under IGRA.
It must be stressed that the Second Circuit never listed the specific games that the
Pequots wanted to offer at their casino. The district court opinion, as well as the other
99
published case documents, similarly failed to list which specific games were at issue.
Thus, Mashantucket simply does not address the Rumsey/Cheyenne River question of
whether a state must bargain for all Class III games when it permits a single Class III
game. Instead, Mashantucket holds only that a state must generally bargain for
commercial Class III gaming if the state already permits non-commercial Class III
gaming.
Admittedly, Mashantucketdoes have some broad language which suggests that the
Second Circuit probably would rule contrary to Rumsey and Cheyenne River if given the
opportunity. For example, Mashantucket holds that when courts decide whether a state
"permits"
Class III
gaming
under
IGRA,
they
should apply
the
100
civil/regulatory-criminal/prohibitory test from Cabazon.
In Cabazon, recall that the
Supreme Court cited California's lottery and horse-race betting as evidence that
10
California's gambling laws were not criminal/prohibitory with respect to bingo. '
Applying this test to IGRA, state authorization of one specific game would be evidence
that the state permits other specific games within the meaning of IGRA's "permits such
gaming" language.
Thus far, however, the Second Circuit has not had the opportunity to apply the
Cabazon test to a Rumsey or Cheyenne River fact pattern. Thus, scholarly accounts of a
circuit split are premature at best.
The only direct circuit precedent for the
Rumsey/Cheyenne River question are those two cases themselves, which hold that a state
need not negotiate for games B, C, or D if the state only permits game A.
2.

State-Tribal Compacts: A Vehicle for State Taxation and Regulation of
Indian Gaming

Even when states cannot prohibit Indian gaming under IGRA, they have significant
ability to tax and regulate Class III gaming operations through the tribal-state gaming
compacts which are a necessary precondition for Class III gaming. 102 In the regulation
context, tribal-state compacts usually limit the number of gaming machines that tribes

97. Id. at 1031-32 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 1029.
99. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 737 F. Supp 169 (D. Conn. 1990); Pet. Writ Cert.,
Mashantucket, 1990 WL 10059085 (Dec. 3, 1990).
100 Mashantucket,913 F.2dat 1031.
101. Review supra notes 22 to 23 and accompanying text.
102. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
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can offer, 10 3 and compacts may contain provisions which subject tribal casinos to state
employment laws, 104 building codes, 10 5 and other regulations. In short, the compacting
process has given states an "unprecendented degree of freedom" to apply civil
regulations against tribal casinos. 10 6 This permissiveness of state regulation stands in
sharp contrast to the Cabazon holding, which had essentially forbidden state regulation
of Indian gaming operations.
It is debatable whether a faithful reading of IGRA would allow states to impose
this broad range of regulatory laws on Indian casinos. As mentioned earlier, the text of
IGRA lists the permissible subjects for tribal-state compacts. 10 7

This list does not

specifically authorize application of state labor laws, building codes, or other general
regulations. 10 8 Moreover, the legislative history of IGRA suggests that Congress did not
intend for tribal-state compacts to include a wide variety of state regulatory laws.
Rather, Congress anticipated that states would only regulate to ensure that Indian casinos
remained free of corruption and organized crime.l°9
Despite the text and legislative history of IGRA, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
a tribal-state compact provision that authorized California to regulate labor relations at
the Coyote Valley Band's casino. 1 1 0 The court found that this labor provision was fairly

103. For example, California's Model Gaming Compact, signed by sixty-one California tribes, limits each
tribe to a total of 2,000 gaming machines. See Model Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra n. 51, at § 4.3.2.2.
104. In Michigan, the state has used the compacting process to apply the Michigan Employment Security
Act and Workers' Compensation Act against tribal casinos and their employees. See Larry Betz & Donna
Budnick, How State and FederalLaws Apply to TribalEmployment, 83 Mich B.J. 15, 16 (July 2004).
105. Wisconsin's gaming compacts require that tribal gaming facilities comply with state codes regulating
electrical wiring, fire prevention, and sanitation in public facilities. See e g. Bad River Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians and State of Wisconsin, Gaming Compact of 1991 §
XIV(A),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docsview2.asp?docid=2127 (last accessed Nov. 20, 2006); Menominee Indian
Tribe of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin, Gaming Compact of 1992 § XIV(A), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/
docsview2.asp?docid=2146 (last accessed Nov. 20, 2006).
106. See William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 291 (3d ed., West 1998) (remarking that
"there is accordingly an unprecedented degree of freedom on the part of the [State and tribe] to allocate
jurisdiction over Class III gaming under the umbrella of the federal Act").
107. Review supra note 43 and accompanying text.
108. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii). However, section 2710(d)(3)(C) does have three broadly
worded clauses that could be interpreted as authorizing application of general state regulatory laws.
Specifically, section 2710(d)(3)(C) authorizes compact provisions relating to:
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that
are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of [gaming] activity;

(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility, including
licensing; and (vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.
109. Consider, for example, the views of Senator Daniel lnouye, a principal drafter of IGRA. On the floor of
the Senate, Senator Inouye explained
There is no intent of the part of Congress that the compacting methodology be used in such areas as
taxation, water rights, environmental regulation, and land use ....
The exigencies caused by the
rapid growth of gaming in Indian country and the threat of corruption and infiltration by criminal
elements in Class III gaming warranted utilization of existing State regulatory capabilities in this
one narrow area. No precedent is meant to be set as to other areas.
134 Cong. Rec. 12651 (1988) (quoting Senator Inouye, 134 Cong. Rec. S24024-25 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988)).
110. See In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1115-17 (9th Cir, 2003). The provision specifically
required the Coyote Valley Band to negotiate with labor unions for a comprehensive labor scheme, and allowed
the state to independently decide whether the resulting scheme was "acceptable." Id. at 1106.
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encompassed within section 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) of IGRA-a catch-all provision which
allows tribal-state compacts to include "any other subjects that are directly related to the
operation of gaming activities."1 11 If other circuits adopt the Ninth Circuit's logic, then
a wide array of state regulatory laws would probably be deemed acceptable under the
same catch-all compacting provision.
Sometimes state efforts to regulate tribal casinos lead to bizarre results. Consider
the case of the Big Lagoon Rancheria Tribe in Northern California. The tribe had long
sought to build a casino on its tribal lands along the Northern California coast. However,
the tribe's land was adjacent to the State-owned Big Lagoon ecological preserve, and the
California Coastal Act sharply limited development in this "environmentally sensitive
habitat area." 112 The State resisted negotiations with the tribe, contending that the
proposed casino would have an unacceptably negative impact on the Big Lagoon
sued the state for violating IGRA's duty to
ecosystem. In 1999, the tribe ultimately
1 13
faith.
good
in
compacts
negotiate
In 2005, the lawsuit was settled in a novel fashion. The tribe agreed to waive all
gaming rights on its ancestral lands, and the state agreed to let the tribe to build a casino
six hundred miles away in Barstow, California. 11 4 Under IGRA, tribes are allowed to set
up gaming operations off their reservations as long as the Secretary of the Interior takes
the off-reservation land in trust for the tribe and the state approves of the transaction. 115
The Big Lagoon deal may have resulted in a mutually agreeable outcome for both
parties, but it also demonstrates states' broad powers to impose civil regulations on tribal
gaming operations. In this case, California used IGRA's compacting process to
effectively leverage the Coastal Act's land-use restrictions against the tribe, refusing to
negotiate for a coastal casino that would have violated those land-use restrictions. The
tribe was forced to undertake a risky lawsuit in order to compel negotiations, and, in the
end, the state achieved its regulatory goal of preventing development around the Big
Lagoon ecosystem.
Compared with state regulation, state taxation of Indian gaming is an even more
complicated issue under IGRA. On a formal level, IGRA holds that states do not have
the power to levy taxes on tribal gaming, except for very limited assessments to
compensate for any costs of state regulation. 116 Thus, while a state may negotiate to
impose its employment or zoning laws on a Class III gaming operation, it may not
negotiate to impose its tax laws on that gaming operation.

Ill. Id. at 1115; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii).
112. See California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30240(a) (West 1996) ("Environmentally
sensitive habitat areas shall be protected against any significant disruption of habitat values, and only uses
dependent on those resources shall be allowed within those areas."); Tribal-State Compact between the State of
Big
Lagoon
Rancheria
1,
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/Press/
California
and
the
BigLagoon Rancheria Compact.pdf (accessed Dec. 30, 2006) (stating that Big Lagoon is an environmentally
sensitive habitat area within the meaning of the California Coastal Act).
113. Carol Park, Tribes Push for Casino Off-Reservation, Bus. Press (San Bernadino, Cal.) (Aug. 8, 2005)
(available at http://www.thebizpress.com).
114. Jim Miller & Gregor McGavin, State Alters Casino Terms, Press Enter. Al (Riverside, Cal.) (Sept. 10,
2005).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b).
116. Id at § 2710(d)(4) (2000).
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However, many compacts do impose a sort of back-door taxation in the form of
"revenue-sharing agreements" or RSAs. Under these agreements, a tribe generally
agrees to share a percentage of gaming revenue with the state in return for a state
promise to prohibit or restrict non-Indian gaming in the state.
The earliest RSAs were signed between Connecticut and its two gaming tribes, the
Mashantucket Pequots and the Mohegans. The compacts provided that the tribes pay
Connecticut 25% of their slot machine revenue in return for an exclusive right to operate
these revenueslot machines in the state. 117 In the first seven years of the compact, 118
coffers.
state
the
for
billion
$1.4
astonishing
an
netted
agreements
sharing
Other states, realizing the revenue potential of RSAs, were quick to follow
Connecticut's lead. Michigan, for example, signed compacts wherein seven tribes would
pay the State 8% of their revenue from electronic Class III games in exchange for the
exclusive right to conduct Class III electronic gaming in the state.1 19 New York struck a
similar agreement with the Seneca and Mohawk tribes, in which the tribes paid the state
25% of their slot machine revenue in exchange for an exclusive right to operate such
120
machines.
Thus far, the Department of the Interior has universally approved tribal-state
RSAs, 12 1 reasoning that they are equitable bargained-for exchanges between states and
tribes rather than unlawful taxation. 122 Under this view, tribes' revenue payments are
simply fair consideration for the state's agreement to provide exclusivity for tribal
gaming.
The few courts to address the issue have likewise upheld tribal-state RSAs,
applying similar logic as the Department of the Interior. The principal case in this
regard, In re Indian Gaming Related Cases,123 upheld California's RSA against a
challenge that it constituted an unlawful tax under IGRA.
The California RSA required that gaming tribes pay into two state funds. The first
fund, known as the Revenue-Sharing Trust Fund, disbursed money to non-gaming tribes
in California. Every non-gaming tribe in the state received $1.1 million per year from
this fund, which was paid by a licensing fee on gaming tribes' slot machines and other
devices. 124 The second fund, known as the Special Distribution Fund, was a more

117. Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 Drake L. Rev. 501, 511 (1995). The Pequot compact was
later amended to allow the Mohegan tribe a similar right to operate slot machines; however, non-Indians are
still prohibited from operating slot machines in the state.
118. Carol Sowers, Indian Casino Profits Get States'Attention, Ariz. Republic Al (Sept. 15, 2000).
119. See Lent, supra n. 50, at 459. The Michigan compacts provided that the 8% payments would cease if
the state allowed Class III electronic gaming by additional tribes as well as by non-Indians. Accordingly, when
the state later entered into Class Ill compacts with four additional tribes, a federal judge found that the seven
original tribes may cease their payments under the compact. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d 850, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
120. Gatsby Contreras, Student Author, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts. Mutual Benefit
Revenue-Sharing or Illegal State Taxation? 5 J. Gender, Race & Just. 487, 496 (2002).
121. The literature does not document any cases of the Department vetoing a tribal-state compact on the
grounds that an RSA provision amounted to forbidden taxation.
122. Sen. Comm. Indian Affairs, Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 108th Cong.,
Sen. Hrg. 108-67 (July 9, 2003) (statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Asst. Sec. Indian Affairs).
123. 331 F.3d 1094.
124. See Model Tribal-State Gaming Compact, supra n. 51, at § 4.3.2.1.
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standard arrangement. The state collected a percentage of the net revenue from tribal
gaming devices and used the money for a variety of governmental purposes. 125 In
tribes the exclusive
exchange for tribal payment into these two funds, the state granted
12 6
right to operate slot machines and banked card games in the state.
The Gaming Cases court found that these tribal payments were lawful on the
grounds that the state offered "meaningful concessions" in the form of its exclusivity
deal. 127 Like the Department of the Interior, the Gaming Cases court concluded that the
exclusivity promise by the state rendered the RSA a permissible exchange of benefits
rather than a prohibited taxation clause.
The court's conclusion is highly dubious, for the simple reason that the California
constitution already prohibited Las Vegas-style gaming.128 The tribes themselves were
only able to negotiate for Class III gaming by successfully bankrolling Proposition IA, a
2000 constitutional amendment that exempted Indian tribes from the constitutional
gambling prohibition. 129 Thus, California's meaningful concessions were nothing more
than a promise not to further amend the state constitution.
And in truth, there was never much chance that the California constitution would
be further amended to allow casino gaming by non-Indians. While California voters
gave the green light to Indian gaming through Proposition 1A, those same voters seem
firmly opposed to non-Indian casino gaming. Consider, for example, the fate of
Proposition 68, a 2004 constitutional amendment drafted by a consortium of non-Indian
racetracks and card clubs that would have authorized 30,000 slot machines at sixteen of
these facilities unless every Class III Indian casino in the state immediately renegotiated
130
its existing compact to give the state 25% of its net revenue.
Newspapers were quick to deride Proposition 68 as a classic bait-and-switch. 13 1
The measure ostensibly sought to give the state a higher percentage of Indian casino
revenue, but its real goal was to legalize non-Indian casino gaming-which Proposition
68 would authorize if just one California tribe refused to renegotiate its existing compact
within ninety days. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger publicly called the
measure a "sham," and Proposition 68's backers actually stopped advertising a full
month before the election after polling showed that it had no chance of passing. 132 It
ultimately lost by the lopsided count of 84% to 16%. 133
The failure of Proposition 68 suggests that non-Indian casino gaming is politically

125. Id. at §§ 5.1-5.2
126. Id. at Preamble, cl. E.
127. In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1112, 1114.
128. See Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(e).
129. See id. at § 19(f).
130. See http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bpnov04/prop_68text-ofjproposedlaw.pdf (accessed Dec. 30,
2006).
131. See Chris Thompson, Rolling the Dice: CaliforniaLooks to Gambling to Solve its FinancialWoes, East
Bay Express (Oct. 27, 2004) (available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/Issues/2004-10-27/news/cityside.
html).
132. See James May, And Then There Was One, Indian Country Today (Oct. 20, 2004) (available at
http://www.indiancountry.com/ content.cfm?id= 1096409709).
133. Cal. Sec. State, Statement of Vote 48, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/
sov_2004_entire.pdf (Dec. 10, 2004).
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infeasible in the state. Thus, when California gives tribes the "concession" of exclusive
gaming rights, the state is hardly conceding anything at all. And without any meaningful
concession by the state, California's RSA becomes nothing more than a prohibited tax
under the Gaming Cases mode of analysis.
Many other RSAs can be deemed back-door taxation for the same reason. When
states agree to bar non-Indian gaming under these agreements, they are generally
agreeing to maintain a status quo that is highly resistant to change in any event. Thus,
the states' concessions are quite minimal, and the RSAs should rightly be considered
unlawful taxation under both the Gaming Cases framework and the Department of
Interior's similar logic.
Arizona provides another good example of how dismal state concessions can be
under tribal-state RSAs. The model Arizona gaming compact, signed by ten tribes in
December 2002, required that tribes pay up to 8% of Class III revenue to the state. 134 In
return, the state5 promised to maintain its current restrictions on casino-style gaming by
13
non-Indians.
But the voters of Arizona seem unlikely to expand non-Indian casino gaming in
any event. Just one month before the state and tribes signed the model compact, Arizona
voters soundly defeated Proposition 201, a measure that would have allowed slot
machines at non-Indian dog tracks. 136 Not only did Proposition 201 fail, it failed by an
overwhelming 4-to- 1 margin. 137 If Proposition 201 is any indication, non-Indian casino
gaming is a political non-starter in Arizona. Thus, when the state's model compact
promises to maintain the status quo on non-Indian gaming, it is merely echoing what the
political calculus had already determined. In this respect, Arizona tribes have not
obtained any meaningful concession to offset the revenue that they must remit to the
state.
By allowing back-door taxation of tribal casinos, IGRA gives states a significant
power that they would otherwise lack. Prevailing precedent holds that states have almost
In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
no power to tax Indians in Indian country.
138
for instance, the Supreme Court barred the state from imposing its
Commission,
personal income tax on an Indian who earned his living on the reservation. In Montana
v.Blackfeet Tribe, 139 the Court blocked a state attempt to tax a tribe's royalties from
reservation oil and gas leases. Indeed, while many Indian law principles entail a
balancing of state and tribal interests, state taxation is subject to "a more categorical
approach: '[a]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,' . . . a
State is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." 14 ° Thus, were it
134. Indian Tribe-State of Arizona Gaming Compact 39, http://www.gm.state.az.us/compact.final.pdf
(accessed Dec. 30, 2006).
135. Id. at 18.
136 See Mary Jo Pitzl, Gaming Initiatives: What They're About, A Guide to the Three Ballot Propositions,
Ariz. Republic AI (Sept. 29, 2002).
137. John Steams, Legal Issues Likely Settled, People Have Spoken, Profs Say, Ariz. Republic A20 (Nov. 7,
2002).
138. 411 U.S. 450(1973).
139. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
140. Okla. Tax Commn. v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (quoting Yakima Co. v Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251,258 (1992)).
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not for IGRA, states would certainly be unable to tax tribally-owned, on-reservation
casinos.
Why, then, do tribes agree to RSAs which are tantamount to disguised state
taxation? One possibility is that tribes are extremely-perhaps even unreasonably-riskaverse. For example, an extremely risk-averse Arizona tribe might worry about future
competition from non-Indian gaming even though the dismal failure of Proposition 201
indicates that non-Indian gaming is presently infeasible in Arizona and probably will
remain infeasible for quite some time. If a tribe is nervous enough about hypothetical
future competition, it might consider revenue-sharing to be a fair trade for a state
promise of exclusive gaming rights.
However, a darker possibility is that tribes agree to RSAs because they have no
other options. After all, Seminole Tribe prevents most tribes from suing states and
contesting the legality of RSAs in federal court. 1 4 1 The Interior Department's
permissive stance toward RSAs prevents tribes from gaining relief by invoking the
And while tribes might
Secretary's post-Seminole dispute-resolution procedure.
theoretically challenge the legality of an RSA in state court-the Eleventh Amendment
are unlikely to provide a fair and
immunity only applies to federal lawsuits-state courts
14 2
impartial forum for claims against the state itself.
C.

The Effects of Indian Gaming on the FederalRecognition Process

While IGRA has important implications for tribal sovereignty, it only addresses the
limited topic of Indian gaming. Thus, with minor exceptions, 14 3 Indian tribes are not
directly affected by IGRA unless they choose to offer gaming.
However, Indian gaming as a whole has had major effects on tribal sovereignty
that extend far beyond the gaming tribes themselves. One prime example is the impact
gaming has had on the ability for putative tribes to gain federal recognition.
1.

An Overview of the Federal Recognition Process

Federal recognition is a necessary first step before any Indian tribe can exercise
federally protected sovereignty over its land and members. For instance, only federally
Federal
recognized tribes enjoy immunity from state taxation and regulation. 144
recognition also gives tribes affirmative rights under federal law, including the right to

141. The In re Gaming Related Cases lawsuit was only possible because California had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity against tribal lawsuits under IGRA. Review supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
142. See Brian Casey Fitzpatrick, Student Author, Finding a Fair Forum: Federal Jurisdictionfor IGRA
Compact Enforcement Actions in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 35 Idaho L. Rev. 159, 176-77
(1998). Even this state lawsuit option might now be unavailable because the Supreme Court has ruled that
states have inherent sovereign immunity from suit in their own courts which is coextensive with their Eleventh
amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Alden v. Me, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
143. IGRA's Class Ill compacting process occasionally entails direct third party effects on non-gaming
tribes. For example, California's 1999 model compact provided for every non-gaming tribe to get $1.1 million
in annual revenue, to be funded by a licensing fee on gaming tribes' slot machines. Review supranote 124 and
accompanying text.
144. See R. Spencer Clift, Ill, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent
DramaticCommercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes under the Bankruptcy
Code and Related Matters, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 177, 195 (2003).
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levy their own taxes and maintain a separate judiciary.1 45 From the perspective of tribal
sovereignty, the importance of federal recognition can hardly be overstated.
There are currently two realistic avenues by which an unrecognized tribe can gain
federal recognition. 146 First, Congress may pass legislation to recognize a specific tribe.
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe-the most successful gaming tribe in the nationof
gained federal recognition through this route in 1983.147 More recently, a handful
48
procedure.1
legislative
this
through
recognition
gained
also
have
tribes
Midwestern
The second and more common method of gaining recognition is through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The BIA has recognized tribes on a case-by-case basis
during most of the twentieth century, but the Bureau did not formally publish a set of
criteria to be applied in all tribal recognition proceedings until 1978.149
Under the current BIA guidelines, a petitioning tribe must satisfy seven madatory
criteria before gaining federal recognition:
1. the tribe has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially
continuous basis since 1900;

2. a predominant portion of the tribe has comprised a distinct community from historical
times until the present;
3.

the tribe has maintained political influence or authority over its members from

historical times until the present;
4. the tribe has submitted a copy of its present governing documents including its
membership criteria;
5. tribal membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe or
from multiple tribes which functioned as a single political entity;
6. membership is composed principally of persons who are not members of any
acknowledged North American Indian tribe; and
7.

neither the group nor its members are the subject of congressional legislation that has

145. H.R. Rpt. No. 103-781, at 2-3 (1994) ("[Federal recognition] institutionalizes the tribe's quasisovereign status, along with all the powers accompanying that status such as the power to tax, and to establish a
separate judiciary."). As this excepted language suggests, many of the rights "granted" by federal recognition
are actually inherent sovereign powers which tribes have always possessed. But given Congress plenary power
to abrogate tribal sovereignty, there is enormous value in federal acknowledgment of tribes' pre-existing
sovereign rights.
146. For a discussion of a theoretical third avenue, review infra notes 153 to 158 and accompanying text.
147. See Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2000). As
its name implies, the bill granting federal recognition to the Pequots was part of a legal settlement for a lawsuit
the Pequots had filed against the State of Connecticut seven years earlier. The lawsuit had alleged that
Connecticut illegally sold large amounts of Pequot land in the mid-nineteenth century. A few other tribes have
also gained congressional recognition in exchange for settling outstanding land claims. See e.g Massachusetts
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1771-1771i (2000); Aroostook Band of Micmacs Settlement
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-171, 105 Stat. 1143 (1992).
148. US. Recognizes 3 Indian Groups, Chi. Trib. § News at 3 (Sept. 22, 1994) (explaining how two
Congressional bills granted federal recognition to the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Little River Band
of Ottawa Indians, and Little Traverse Bay Band of Ottawa Indians).
149. See Roberto lraola, The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the Courts, 38 Akron L. Rev.
867, 871-73 (2005).
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Once a tribe submits a petition for recognition that includes documentation of all seven
criteria, the BIA will place the tribe on "active consideration" and must issue proposed
15 1
findings within one year as to whether the tribe should gain federal recognition.
Unfortunately, this one year requirement is usually honored in the breach. In 2002, the
BIA itself admitted that it might take fifteen years to fully process the petitions currently
52
pending before it. 1
It is sometimes asserted that tribes can gain recognition through a third, judicial
route. 153 Indeed, Congress itself has declared that tribes may be recognized "by a
decision of a United States court.' 154 But this judicial route is practically unavailable
because courts generally apply the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
155
and primary jurisdiction to defeat tribal recognition claims.
Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a court will refuse 15to6
recognize a tribe if the tribe has not fully availed itself of the BIA recognition process.
Given the glacial pace of the BIA process, this exhaustion doctrine bars a great many
tribes from obtaining judicial recognition while their recognition petitions wind their way
through the BIA machinery.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine performs the same function as the exhaustion
doctrine, but in a slightly different context. The classic example is land claims. When a
tribe sues to recover illegally taken land, the outcome of the lawsuit often turns on
whether the tribe meets the federal recognition criteria. 157 If the tribe has not yet been
federally recognized, courts will usually hold the tribe's lawsuit in abeyance in order to
1 58
give the BIA primary jurisdiction to either recognize or not recognize the tribe.
The conceptual difference between two doctrines is that the exhaustion doctrine
applies when either the BIA or the court could give the tribe its requested relief (i.e.,
federal recognition), while the primary jurisdiction doctrine applies when the tribe's
ultimate requested relief can only be given by a court (e.g., damages for illegally taken
land.) But both doctrines effectively bar federal courts from recognizing tribes,
notwithstanding courts' formal power to do so.

150. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2004).
151. ld.at§ 83.10.
152. H.R. Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Nat. Resources & Reg. Affairs of the Comm. on Govt. Reform,
More Consistent and Timely Recognition Process Needed, 107th Cong., Comm. Serial No. 107-145 at 20,
2003-H401-21, (Feb. 7, 2002) (statement of Barry T. Hill, Dir., Nat. Resources & Env., BIA).
153. See e.g John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians: The Battle for Recognition, 69
UMKC L. Rev. 311, 322 (2000).
154. Pub. L. No. 103-454, § 103(3), 108 Stat. 4791,4791 (1995).
155. See Ragsdale, supra n. 153, at 328; see generally William W. Quinn, Jr., FederalAcknowledgment of
American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. § 83, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37
(1992).
156. See e.g. W. Shoshone Bus. Council v. Babbitt, I F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 1993); James v. US. Dept.
Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
157. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the criteria for
a tribe to sustain a land claim lawsuit are substantially the same as the criteria for BIA recognition); Catawba
Indian Tribe of S.C. v. S.C., 718 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1983).
158. See Golden Hill, 39 F.3d at 60; U.S. v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D. Conn. 1999);
but see N.Y. v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (finding that the Shinnecock
Indian Nation is an Indian tribe for purposes of tribal land claim despite its lack of BIA recognition).
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2.

Indian Gaming Raises the Barriers to Federal Recognition

The advent of Indian gaming has complicated tribal recognition efforts, chiefly by
dramatically raising the cost of BIA recognition. One staffer from the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs estimates that recognition typically cost less than $200,000 before
gaming, and now recognition efforts cost in the millions. 159 Christine Grabowski, an
anthropologist heavily involved in many recognition proceedings, has remarked that the
expenses associated with gaining
recognition have become so high that they "do the
' 160
process ... a great injustice."
Indian gaming has raised the costs of federal recognition because only federally
recognized tribes may conduct gaming under IGRA, 16 1 and popular belief holds that
tribes only seek federal recognition in order to offer gaming. 162 Therefore, tribal
recognition efforts are vigorously opposed by anti-gambling advocates as well as present
gaming interests who fear competition from the newly recognized tribe. Under the BIA
guidelines, any interested party may submit factual or legal arguments for or against the
tribe's petition for recognition, 163 and opposing interests sometimes flood the BIA with
information arguing against the recognition of a new tribe. 164 The end result is a long,
expensive war of paper between supporters and opponents of recognition.
Even when tribes initially succeed in gaining BIA recognition, opponents have
sometimes protracted the fight by appealing the BIA's decision. For example, the
Schaghticoke Tribe of Connecticut sought recognition throughout the 1990s, fighting
constant opposition from Connecticut's attorney general and assorted anti-casino groups.
The anti-Schaghticoke forces freely admitted that their opposition stemmed from a
concern that the Schagticokes, if recognized, would open a casino in the state.165 But, in
2004, the Schaghticokes appeared to have finally won their battle for recognition when
the BIA approved their petition.
Undaunted, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal appealed the
decision to the Interior Department's Board of Indian Appeals, which overturned the
Schagticokes' recognition in 2005.166 To continue their recognition efforts, the

159. Iver Peterson, Would-be Tribes Entice Investors, N.Y. Times AI (Mar. 29, 2004).
160. Ellen Barry, Tribal Gamble: The Lure and Perilof Indian Gaming: A War of Genealogies Rages, Bos.
Globe Al (Dec. 12, 2000).
161. 25 U.S.C. §2703(5). Of course, even before IGRA, only federally recognized tribes possessed the
inherent sovereignty to set up gambling enterpnses (or any other enterprises) free from state regulation.
Review supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
162. Jack Campisi, Reflections on the Last Quarter Century of Tribal Recognition, 37 New Eng. L. Rev.
505, 507 (2003). Campisi points out that this popular belief does not stand up to critical analysis because the
vast majority of tribes who are currently pursuing recognition began their efforts well before Cabazon and
IGRA.
See also Mark Edwin Miller, Forgotten Tribes: Unrecognized Indians and the Federal
Acknowledgment Process 253 (U. Neb. Press 2004) ("After the phenomenal gaming-fueled success of recently
acknowledged tribes in the Northeast, [unacknowledged tribes] have had to overcome a pervasive idea that
many, if not the majority, of unacknowledged peoples were assimilated 'pretenders' lining up to cash in on the
gaming bonanza.").
163. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(a) (2004).
164. Alex Fryer, Some Tribes Still See PromisesBroken, Dreams Thwarted,Seattle Times B I(May 3, 2004).
165. Light& Rand,supran. 3, at61.
166. Dan Strempel, Fed's Flip Has Tribe PlanningLawsuit, Fairfield Co. Bus. J. (Oct. 24, 2005) (available
at http://www.fairfieldcountybusinessjoumal.com/archive/102405/102405fropO I.html).
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Schaghticokes must now seek judicial review of the Board's decision in federal court-a
very chancy and expensive undertaking.
The Chinook Tribe of Washington provides the slightly different example of a
tribe who initially gained BIA recognition, only to see a rival tribe appeal the decision
and ultimately overturn it. The Chinooks gained their recognition in January 2001, but
the neighboring Quinault Tribe appealed the decision to the Board of Indian Appeals. In
July 2002 the Board agreed with the Quinaults and overturned the Chinooks'
recognition.167 According to some press accounts, the Quinaults' opposition was driven
to compete with the
by fears that a recognized Chinook Tribe could open a casino
68
Quinault Beach Resort and Casino on the Washington coast.1
A tribe may face gaming-related resistance to its recognition efforts regardless of
the tribe's own position on gaming. For example, when the Los Angeles-area
Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe sought federal recognition in 2001, its leaders emphatically
denied any plans to open a casino. 169 Yet these statements failed to quell gaming-related
opposition from local governments, who argued that the Tongvas'70anti-gambling stance
could quickly change if there was any change in tribal leadership. 1
The Tongva example 171 underscores how closely tribal recognition and gaming are
linked in the public consciousness. If an unrecognized tribe is geographically positioned
to open a profitable casino, there may be nothing that the tribe can do to convince third
parties that it will not begin gaming once given recognition. Thus, virtually all
unrecognized tribes-save perhaps those in very remote areas-must contend with
gaming-related opposition to their federal recognition efforts.
The Schaghticokes, Chinooks, and Tongvas all illustrate the way in which gaming
has raised the cost and difficulty of gaining BIA recognition. On the other hand, gaming
does provide some tribes with vastly increased resources which they can use to pursue
recognition. Unrecognized tribes near major metropolitan areas are often courted by
wealthy casino investors who promise to bankroll the tribe's recognition efforts in
exchange for a share of any future casino profits. These investors may offer "dream
teams" of anthropologists and genealogists to assemble the detailed historical and
genealogical records which the BIA requires. 172 Thus, for casino-savvy tribes willing to

167. See Linda Shaw, Chinooks Invited to the White House, Then Lose Their Federal Recognition, Seattle
Times AI (July 8, 2002).
168. Paul Shukovsky, Chinooks, Quinaults Wage Legal Battle over Recognition, Resources, Seattle PostIntelligencer AI (Apr. 7, 2001).
169. Margaret Talev, Gaming Issue Muddies Regional Tribe's Pursuit of Recognition; Rights: Gabrielino
Indians Seek Sovereign Status and FederalAid, but Critics Fear What They Really Want Is a Casino, L.A.
Times B7 (Oct. 25, 2001).
170. Id.; see also Bill Hillburg, Tribe Seeks Recognitionfrom U.S.; Rivals Suspect CasinoPlans, L.A. Daily
News N12 (Dec. 23, 2001). As it turns out, anti-gambling forces were correct to be skeptical of the Tongvas'
claims. Three years after they disavowed any interest in gaming, the Tongva leadership announced that it
would consider casino plans if given federal recognition. See Louis Sahagun, Tribe May Consider L.A.-Area
Casino, L.A. Times B3 (Aug. 26, 2004).
171. The Tongvas have been seeking recognition through Congress as well as through the BIA. But the
Tongva example still illustrates the point that anti-gaming interests may oppose tribal recognition even when
the tribe itself emphatically denies any interest in gaming.
172. Barry, supra n. 160. The Connecticut Mohegans provide an example of a tribe whose recognition
efforts were lavishly funded by outside casino investors. Hotel developer Len Wolman spent approximately
ten million dollars to fund the Mohegans' recognition efforts in the early nineties. Review Johnathan
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embrace outside investors, the increased costs of BIA recognition might be more than
offset by the vastly increased resources that these tribes can apply towards their
recognition efforts.
But what about unrecognized tribes who disavow gaming, for either practical or
moral reasons? As the Tongva example illustrates, tribes who disavow gaming may still
face gaming-related opposition to their recognition efforts. But these tribes cannot rely
on wealthy casino investors to help offset the gaming-related opposition. In short, the
advent of Indian gaming has been an unmitigated disaster for unrecognized, anti-gaming
tribes: it has dramatically raised the cost of federal recognition without giving these
tribes any additional resources to help them in their recognition efforts.
D.

Indian Gaming as a Driving Force behind City of Sherrill

Indian gaming has potentially reduced the sovereignty of all existing tribes by
helping drive the recent Supreme Court opinion in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation.173 Sherrill deals a sharp blow to tribal sovereignty, preventing tribes from
buying back illegally taken land and asserting sovereign rights over the newly acquired
land parcels. The Sherrill decision, and the hidden role that Indian gaming likely played
in that decision, is described below.
1.

An Overview of Sherrill

Sherrill involved an attempt by the City of Sherrill, New York, to tax parcels of
land owned in fee by the Oneida Indian Nation (Nation). The Nation resisted these
taxes, claiming that the land parcels were sovereign Indian territory and thus immune
174
from state and local taxation.
The land parcels had a long and complicated history of ownership. They were
originally part of the Nation's 300,000-acre reservation, which had been established near
the dawn of the United States. 175 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
the Nation sold off virtually its entire reservation, including the land parcels at issue, to
the State of New York. 176 In the 1985 case, County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation
(Oneida I1),177 the Supreme Court held that these centuries-old sales of reservation land
were illegal because a federal statute (the Non-Intercourse Act) had forbidden states
from buying Indian land without the participation of the federal government. 17 8 Because
the land sales were illegal, the Court found that the Nation could sue the present owners

Rabinowitz, A Battlefield Topped with Felt: Casino Mogul Helps Mohegans Renew an Old Rivalry, N.Y. Times
1 (Aug. 5, 1996).
173. 544 U.S. 197, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (2005).
174. Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1489.
175. Id. at 1483.
176. Id. at 1484-85.
177. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
178. Id. at 232-33. The Non-Intercourse Act specifically declared that: "no sale of lands made by any
Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to
any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly
executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States." I Stat. 138, § 4 (1790).
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of that land for wrongful possession and collect money damages. 17 9 However, the Court
reserved the question of whether "equitable considerations should limit the relief
available to the present day Oneida Indians."' 180 This cryptic statement was widely
understood to reference the idea that the Court might be unwilling to actually eject the
current inhabitants of the Oneidas' reservation.181
In the years following Oneida II, the Nation bought the land parcels at issue in
open-market transactions. 182 Relying on Oneida II, the Nation claimed that these
parcels had always legally remained reservation land. The Nation thus refused to pay
local taxes on the parcels, arguing that localities may not tax or regulate tribally owned
court granted the Nation's claim for tax immunity, and
reservation land. 183 The district
18
the Second Circuit affirmed. 4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Oneidas could not exercise
sovereign tax immunity over the recently acquired land parcels. The Court found that
granting tax immunity over the two parcels would be inequitable, due to the long period
of time that the land parcels had been under the jurisdiction of New York, and the
disruptive consequences that would result if the Oneidas were able to establish sovereign
85
jurisdiction over the parcels. 1
Regarding the time period, the Court noted that the wrongful sale of the Oneidas'
reservation occurred in the early years of the United States, and New York had exercised
jurisdiction over this land for nearly two centuries. According to the Court, the two
that
hundred years of uninterrupted state jurisdiction created "justifiable expectations"
186
the state-rather than the Nation-would continue to exercise jurisdiction.
Regarding the consequences, the Court claimed that granting the Oneidas
187
jurisdiction over the land parcels would have "disruptive practical consequences."
The Court noted that most of the surrounding land and population was non-Indian, and
the land parcels at issue were scattered throughout the predominantly non-Indian area.
Thus, the Court concluded that granting the Nation sovereign authority over the parcels
would create a "checkerboard of alternating state and tribal jurisdiction" which would
seriously burden the administration of local governance and adversely affect neighboring
landowners. 188 In particular, the Court worried that:
If [the Oneida Indian Nation] may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these
parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new

179. Id.
180. Id. at 253 n. 27.
181. See Joshua N. Lief, The Oneida Land Claims: Equity and Ejectment, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 825, 830-31
(1988).
182. Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1488.
183. id. at 1489.
184. Id. at 1488.
185. Id. at 1490 n. 9 ("The relief [the Oneida Indian Nation] seeks-recognition of present and future
sovereign authority to remove the land from local taxation-is unavailable because of the long lapse of time,
during which New York's governance remained undisturbed, and the present-day and future disruption such
relief would engender.").
186. Id. at 1490-91.
187. Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1493.
188. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss1/8

24

Sohn: The Double-Edged Sword of Indian Gaming
INDIAN GAMING

2006]

generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls
that protect all landowners in the area. 189
2.

The Illogic of Sherrill

The Court's two grounds for denying tax immunity to the Oneidas are both highly
dubious in light of earlier Supreme Court precedent. Regarding the "length of time"
argument, it is certainly true that New York had exercised jurisdiction over the land
parcels for nearly two centuries. But in Oneida II, the Court had expressly rejected the
argument that a very long period of state jurisdiction could defeat the Oneidas' claim for
wrongful possession. 190 Thus, it is unclear why a similarly long period of state
jurisdiction should bar the Oneidas from re-establishing tax immunity over the recently
acquired land parcels.
Regarding the "disruptive consequences" point, it is also true that granting the
Oneidas tax immunity over the land parcels would create a checkerboard of alternating
state and tribal jurisdiction in the area. But the Court has not worried about such
jurisdictional checkerboards in the past. Quite the opposite: prevailing precedent on
jurisdiction over Indian reservations embraces the idea of checkerboard state and tribal
jurisdiction.
The prime case in this regard is Montana v. United States, 19 1 which dealt with
attempts by the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians within the
Crow reservation. The Court concluded that the tribe may regulate non-Indian hunting
and fishing on Indian-owned land within the reservation, but the tribe may not regulate
this activity on reservation land owned in fee by non-Indians. 192 Thus, when it comes to
regulating non-Indian activities within the reservation, the Court effectively granted the
state jurisdiction on non-Indian fee land193 while granting the tribe jurisdiction on the
remaining Indian-owned land.
Montana created an elaborate checkerboard of state and tribal jurisdiction within
the Crow reservation. Thirty percent of the reservation was owned in fee by nonIndians, 194 and this 30% was broadly scattered amidst tribally owned land and individual

189. Id.
190 Oneida H, 470 U.S. at 253 ("One would have thought that claims dating back for more than a century
and a half would have been barred long ago. As our opinion indicates, however, neither petitioners nor we
have found any applicable statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding that the Oneidas'
claims are barred or otherwise have been satisfied.").
191. 450U.S.544(1981).
192 Id. at 557. "Indian-owned land" within the Crow Reservation consisted of land which was allotted to
individual Crow Indians and land held in trust for the tribe as a whole. See id.
at 548.
193. The language in Montana primarily referenced the regulatory jurisdiction of the tribe, not the state. But
it seems clear that the state would exercise jurisdiction whenever the tribe is barred from doing so. See id. at
566-67 (referencing state regulations as the default authority over non-member fee land because tribal
regulations are inapplicable); see also Katosha Belvin Nakai, Student Author, Red Rover, Red Rover: A Call
for Comity in Linking Tribal and State Long-Arm Provisionsfor Service of Process in Indian Country, 35 Ariz.
St. L.J. 633, 668 n. 172 (2003) (noting "'Montana... seem[s] to suggest that the state can assert jurisdiction on
non-Indian fee lands").
194. Mont., 540 U.S. at 548. This 30% figure included 28% owned in fee by individual non-Indians and 2%
owned in fee by the state of Montana itself.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

25

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 8
TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 42:139

Indian allotments. 195 According to the Court, the State of Montana could regulate nonIndian hunting and fishing on this scattered 30%, while the tribe could regulate the
remaining portion of the reservation.
Of course, Montana created a precedent of checkerboard jurisdiction that extends
far beyond the Crow reservation itself. After all, many Indian reservations are
characterized by a pattern of non-Indian fee land broadly dispersed among Indian-owned
land. This pattern is a legacy of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
allotment policy, under which the federal government allotted tribal land to individual
Indians and authorized those Indians to sell their allotments to outsiders. 196 By
mandating that regulatory jurisdiction track the nature of land ownership, Montana
guarantees a complicated checkerboard of alternating state and tribal jurisdiction over a
huge portion of Indian country.
In later years, the Court applied the Montana framework to other types of
government regulation, including taxes 197 and zoning restrictions.198 Taken as a whole,
these cases grant states broad governmental authority over non-Indian fee land, while
granting tribes broad authority over Indian-owned land. Thus, in many cases, the
question of tribal versus state jurisdiction over a piece of land turns on the ownership of
that land. 199 And given the checkerboard pattern of land ownership in many Indian
reservations, the Montana line of cases establishes a corresponding checkerboard of state
and tribal jurisdiction.
Given the Court's past embrace of checkerboard jurisdiction, it seems bizarre-or
disingenuous-for the Sherrill court to cite the supposed inequity of checkerboard
jurisdiction as a reason for denying the Oneidas' claim. But the peculiarities of Sherrill
do not end there. The Court's grounds for denying the Oneidas' claim were not only
contrary to Court precedent, they were also completely ignored by the two parties in the
case. The petitioning City of Sherrill based its case on the theory that the land in
question was no longer Indian country, either because Congress had never set aside the
Oneidas' reservation or because Congress had disestablished that reservation in the
nineteenth century. 200 The Oneidas responded, naturally enough, by asserting that
Congress had set aside their reservation in a 1794 treaty and had never disestablished

195. See Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty through Agreement, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 523, 528
n. 26 (2003).
196. Nakai, supra n. 193, at 648 n. 85 ("Because the Indian allotment policies opened many reservations up
to non-Indian settlement, today many reservations have a so-called checkerboard pattern of ownership.").
197. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
198. ConfederatedTribes, 492 U.S. 408 (plurality).
199. There are certainly exceptions to this general rule of state authority over private fee land and tribal
authority over Indian-owned land. For example, Montana itself set out two situations in which tribes may
regulate non-Indians on private fee land: (1) when the non-Indian has entered into consensual dealings with the
tribe or its members and (2) when the non-Indian's conduct threatens the political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare of the tribe. See Mont., 450 U.S. at 555-56. Conversely, states may regulate Indianowned land under certain circumstances. See e.g. Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 333. But these exceptions do not
alter the general point: in a wide variety of cases, the choice between state and tribal authority will hinge on
whether the land in question is owned by Indians or non-Indians.
200. Petr.'s Br. 13-16 (Aug. 12, 2004). The City of Sherrill also argued that the Oneidas may have ceased to
exist around the turn of the twentieth century and that any period of tribal non-existence would prevent the land
from currently being considered "Indian country." See id. at 40.
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that reservation. 20 1 Conspicuously absent from the parties' historical analysis was any
talk about whether current equitable considerations should influence the outcome of the
case. The Supreme Court itself candidly admitted that its Sherrill opinion was based on
"considerations not discretely identified in the parties' briefs."2 °2
3.

The Gaming Backlash Theory of Sherrill

Why did the Supreme Court disregard the issues raised by the parties, instead
deciding Sherrill based on an alternative theory that runs contrary to Court precedent?
Obviously, one cannot say for certain. But this comment contends that Sherrill was
likely driven by a backlash against Indian gaming-a fear that Indian gaming would
mushroom uncontrollably if the Oneidas and similar tribes were allowed to establish
sovereignty over recently acquired land.
There is strong circumstantial evidence for this view. As the previous discussion
about federal recognition demonstrates, Indian gaming has spawned a vigorous backlash
from neighboring communities and society at large. It certainly seems plausible that the
Court would be sensitive to the anti-gaming backlash. One scholar recently opined that
the Court is very cognizant of public attitudes toward
Indians and may pen anti-Indian
20 3
decisions to avoid further stirring a public backlash.
Moreover, the result in Sherrill is consistent with the "gaming backlash"
hypothesis. By denying the Oneidas' claim, the Court effectively prevented the
Oneidas-or any similarly situated tribe-from reacquiring illegally taken land and
putting a gaming facility on that land. 20 4 Sherrill's ability to curtail Indian gaming can
best be seen by examining a closely related case, Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v.
Village of Union Springs (Union Springs 1).205
The Cayuga case involved a strikingly similar fact pattern to Sherrill. Like the
Oneidas, the Cayuga Indian Nation possessed a large New York reservation at the dawn
of the United States. And like the Oneidas, the Cayugas sold virtually their entire
reservation to New York in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, in violation
of the Non-Intercourse Act.206 Not surprisingly, a federal court confirmed that these
sales of Cayuga land were void,207 and thus the present-day Cayugas could collect
20 8
damages for wrongful possession from the current occupants of the land.
In 2003, the Cayugas purchased a piece of their illegally taken reservation and

201. Respt.'s Br. 10 (Sept. 30, 2004).
202. Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1490 n. 8.
203. Louis F. Claiborne, The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases, 22 Am. Indian L. Rev.
585, 588-89 (1998) ("I have suggested that stirring a public backlash may encourage the Supreme Court to call
a sharp halt to the recognition of Indian rights, and may even persuade it to retreat somewhat.").
204. However, it should be noted that, even before Sherrill, only tribes with presently existing reservations
would have been able to reacquire land and exert governmental sovereignty over that land. See infra note 219
and accompanying text.
205. 317 F. Supp. 2d 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, Cayuga Indian Nation of NY. v. Village of Union
Springs (Union Springs 11),
390 F. Supp. 2d 203 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
206. Union Springs l,317 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
207. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y v. Pataki,79 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
208. Cayuga Indian Nation of N. Y v. Cuomo, 1999 WL 509422 at *30 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999).
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began building a Class II gaming facility on this property. 209 The Village of Union
Springs, in which the property was located, tried to apply its local zoning codes to stop
this construction. 2 1 In 2004, a federal district court enjoined Union Spring from
applying its zoning codes against the property on the grounds that the property remained
part of the Cayugas' reservation and municipalities have no authority to zone tribally
2 11
owned reservation land.
The very next year, however, the Supreme Court decided Sherrill. In the wake of
Sherrill, Union Springs moved to lift the 2004 injunction, and the district court readily
granted its motion. 2 12 The court based its decision exclusively on Sherrill. Specifically,
the court reasoned that granting the Cayugas immunity from municipal zoning would
have the same "disruptive consequences" that led the Supreme Court to deny the
Oneidas' tax immunity in Sherrill.2 13 The practical effect of this new Union Springs
decision was immediate and predictable: within days, the Cayugas were forced to close
2 14
their year-old gaming facility.
Union Springs demonstrates how the Sherrill opinion has been used to curtail the
expansion of Indian gaming. Furthermore, there is language in Sherrill suggesting that
the Supreme Court precisely intended to influence Union Springs and similar cases. As
mentioned earlier, the Sherrill Court explicitly worried that granting the Oneidas tax
immunity would allow them to initiate a new round of litigation to free the property from
zoning and regulatory control. 2 15 Sherrill then dropped a footnote warning that "[o]ther
tribal entities have already sought to free historic reservation lands purchased in the open
market from local regulatory controls." 2 16 This footnote cited only two cases: the
original Union Springs opinion and the case of Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Town ofAurelius, New York. 2 17 Both cases involved tribes who purchased land within
their ancestral reservations and sought to build gaming facilities on this land in
contravention of local zoning codes.
This footnote strongly suggests that when the Sherrill Court worried about tribes'
flouting local zoning codes, the Court was specifically worried that tribes would set up
unauthorized gaming facilities. In other words, the fear of increased Indian gaming was
the driving force behind Sherrill.
Finally, the gaming backlash hypothesis can explain why the Court decided
Sherrill on grounds not addressed by either party. As mentioned earlier, the parties in
Sherrill focused on the historical record, debating whether Congress had ever established
or disestablished the Oneidas' reservation. 2 18 This debate is certainly germane to the

209. Union Springs1, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
210. Id. at 133.
211. Id. at 148 (concluding that the property remained Indian country for purposes of municipal zoning).
212. Union Springs If, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203.
213 Id. at 206. Indeed, the court suggested that immunity from municipal zoning is more disruptive than
immunity from municipal taxation. See id.
214. David L. Shaw, Cayugas Close Bingo Hall: Nation Had Faced Threat of Forced Closurefrom Union
Springs Mayor, Syracuse Post-Standard Al (Oct. 11, 2005).
215. Review supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216. Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1493 n. 13.
217. 2004 WL 1945359 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,2004).
218. Review supra notes 200 to 201 and accompanying text.
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question in Sherrill because a tribe whose reservation had been congressionally
disestablished would be categorically barred from exerting sovereignty over re-acquired
land within that former reservation. 219 But if the Court had decided Sherrill on these
grounds, then Sherrill would have little precedential value for other cases involving other
Indian tribes. For example, the Cayugas' claim in Union Springs would hardly be
affected by a finding that Congress had previously disestablished the Oneidas'
reservation.
By focusing instead on the "disruptive consequences" of granting the Oneidas'
claim, the Sherrill Court was able to create a general precedent that would bar other
tribes from buying back illegally taken land and putting casinos on their new property.
After all, any tribe which reacquires land in a predominantly non-Indian area would
engender "disruptive consequences" by flouting municipal zoning codes and building an
unauthorized casino on such land. Union Springs is but one example of how the logic of
Sherrill bars other tribes from establishing Indian gaming on reacquired land. In short,
the gaming backlash hypothesis can explain not only the result in Sherrill but also why
the Sherrill Court employed the anomalous disruptive consequences logic in reaching its
conclusions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This comment has sketched the ways in which Indian gaming has thus far
impacted tribal sovereignty. Yet the story is far from over. As Indian gaming continues
to grow in the United States-$19.4 billion per year at last count-one expects that
gaming will continue to engender negative changes in the contours and extent of tribal
sovereignty. Indeed, there are preliminary signs that other aspects of tribal sovereignty
may already be eroding as Indian gaming thrusts tribes into the legal forefront.
For example, the California Supreme Court has recently abrogated tribal sovereign
immunity in a gaming-related context. In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Superior Court,22 0 the court held that the California Fair Political Practices Commission
could sue the Agua Caliente Tribe in order to compel the tribe to report its campaign
contributions in accordance with California law. 22 1 The court expressly rejected the
tribe's contention that its sovereign immunity shielded it from the Commission's
22 2
lawsuit.
Agua Caliente, on its face, is not a case about Indian gaming. But in fact, the
tribe's massive campaign contributions were funded almost exclusively from the tribe's
lucrative Palm Springs casinos. 223 Moreover, these campaign contributions generally
went to support gaming-related ballot propositions and political candidates who were

219. Indeed, for this very reason, the Second Circuit Sherrill opinion had largely focused on whether
Congress had disestablished the Oneidas' reservation, and the opinion concluded that Congress had not done
so. See Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 160-65 (2nd Cir. 2003). By deciding Sherrill
on other grounds, the Supreme Court implicitly let this conclusion stand.
220. 2006 WL 3741905 (Cal. Dec. 21, 2006).
221. Id. at *1.
222. Jd.at*15.
223. Jake Henshaw, Ruling Has Implicationsfor Agua Caliente Tribe, Desert Sun (Palm Springs, Cal.) B I
(Apr. 26, 2003).
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thought to be supportive of Indian gaming. 224 Indeed, Agua Caliente can best be seen as
a struggle between a wealthy gaming tribe anxious to protect its interests and a state
determined to subject the tribe to the normal rules of the political process.
At the federal level, a recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board
indicates that tribes may lose another aspect of their sovereignty-namely, their
traditional exemption from federal labor laws. In San Manuel Indian Bingo and
Casino,225 the NLRB held that the National Labor Relations Act applied to the tribally
22 6
owned, on-reservation casino reversing thirty years of NLRB precedent.
In reaching its conclusions, the San Manuel opinion stressed that the tribe's casino
employed large numbers of non-Indian employees and catered to a predominantly nonIndian client base. 22 7 According to San Manuel,
When Indian tribes participate in the national economy in commercial enterprises, when
they employ substantial numbers of non-Indians, and when their businesses cater to nonIndian clients and customers, the tribes affect interstate commerce in a significant way.
When the Indian tribes act in this manner, the special attributes of their sovereignty are not
22 8
implicated.
The San Manuel board apparently felt compelled to modify tribes' long-standing
exemption from the National Labor Relations Act, given the emergence of tribal casinos
as major regional employers whose economic impact reached Indians and non-Indians
alike. It remains to be seen whether federal courts will uphold San Manuel, but certainly
the decision suggests that tribal immunity from federal labor laws may be eroding.
Viewed together, Agua Caliente and San Manuel demonstrate how the wealth and
influence of certain gaming tribes may cause courts and agencies to curtail tribal
sovereignty in response. This is hardly a surprising phenomenon. When Indian tribes
were poor and marginalized, few people cared to challenge tribal sovereign immunity or
regulate meager tribal businesses. But in the modem gaming era, wealthy Indian tribes
are seen as serious political and economic actors who must be subjected to the normal
regulatory rules that constrain all other actors.
Indeed, Agua Caliente and San Manuel are simply following the path laid down by
IGRA, Sherrill,and other legal developments. These cases and statutes are all examples
of how courts and legislatures have responded to Indian gaming by cutting back on tribal
sovereignty. Similarly, gaming-related opposition to tribes' federal recognition efforts
reflects a more grassroots attempt to limit tribal sovereignty. All these examples show
how the economic success of Indian gaming has spawned a backlash that threatens the
historic sovereignty of Indian tribes.

224. See Josh Richman, Two Gaming Measures on Ballot, but One Is DOA, Alameda Times-Star (Oct. 19,
2004) (stating the Agua Caliente Tribe donated approximately $12.5 million to Proposition 70, an unsuccessful
ballot proposition related to Indian gaming); Benjamin Spillman, Battin Affirms Support of Easing Restrictions
on Indian Gambling, Desert Sun (Palm Springs, Cal.) B4 (Mar. 25, 2004) (stating that the Agua Caliente Tribe
has donated nearly $400,000 in recent years to support State Senator Jim Battin, one of the foremost
proponents of Indian gaming in the California Legislature).
225. 341 NLRB 1055 (2004).
226. See Southern Indian Health Council, Inc., 290 NLRB 436 (1988); Ft. Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB
503 (1976).
227. San Manuel Indian Bingo, 341 NLRB at 1062.
228. Id.
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This comment is not a call for tribes to end their gaming enterprises. For one
thing, the economic success of gaming strongly counsels that tribes should not abandon
this crucial source of revenue. Just as gaming has lifted some tribes out of poverty, a
willful suspension of gaming could cause these tribes to sink right back into poverty.
For another thing, this genie cannot be put back in its bottle. The losses in tribal
sovereignty-at least some of them-are here to stay. If every Indian tribe suspended
gaming operations tomorrow, Sherrillwould still stay on the books. Unrecognized tribes
would still face gaming-related opposition from third parties suspicious about their future
intentions.
But this comment does call on tribes to recognize the gaming backlash and to do
what they can to minimize its continued effects. At the legislative level, tribes must
lobby Congress to resist further diminishments of tribal sovereignty. At the judicial
level, tribes must use their gaming profits to fund legal challenges to arrest the recent
slew of anti-Indian court decisions. And, perhaps most importantly, tribes must
assiduously educate the American citizenry that Indian tribes are not simply economic
actors who should be regulated and taxed in the same way as private businesses. As one
present example, the San Manuel Tribe has recently run television commercials that
highlight the constitutionally protected nature of tribal sovereignty. 229 Such educational
messages are critical to counteract peoples' all-too-common perception of Indian tribes
as nothing more than private casino entrepreneurs.
Like Indian gaming itself, the gaming backlash is here to stay. Yet from the tribal
perspective, the backlash can and must be minimized. It would be sadly ironic if the
"new buffalo" of Indian gaming destroyed the very sovereignty that gives Indian tribes
their unique legal identity.
Joshua L. Sohn*

229. See Waltona Manion & Assocs., Sovereignty, http://161.58.73.137/SPAN/sovereigntydownload5-905.wmv (date unknown) (television commercial) (accessed Dec. 30, 2006); Government to Government,
http://161.58.73.137/SPAN/Gov2Gov.wmv (date unknown) (television commercial) (accessed Dec. 30, 2006).
* Law clerk for the Honorable Jerome Farris, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, J.D., Harvard Law School
2006; A.B., Stanford University, 2003. 1 would like to thank Professor Carole Goldberg for her invaluable

comments and suggestions during the writing of this paper, and Professor Alexander Skibine for his wonderful
course in Federal Indian Law. The opinions expressed herein are my own and should not be taken to represent
those of Judge Farris or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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